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Abstract
There exists a utilitarian tradition a` la Sidgwick of treating equal genera-
tions equally. Diamond showed that there exists no social evaluation ordering
over infinite utility streams in the presence of the Pareto principle, the Sidgwick
principle, and continuity. Instead of requiring the Sidgwick principle of proce-
dural fairness, we focus on two principles of distributional egalitarianism along
the line of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and the Lorenz domination prin-
ciple, and show that there exists no social evaluation relation satisfying one of
these egalitarian principles and the weakened continuity and rationality axioms
even in the absence of the Pareto principle.
JEL Classification Nos.: D63, D71
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1. Introduction
According to Aristotle’s Politics, “[e]quality consists in the same treatment
of similar persons.”1 One way to make this abstract equity principle operational
is to rephrase it as a requirement of anonymity to the effect that one distribu-
tion of transferable benefits among persons should be judged socially equivalent
to any interpersonal permutation thereof. As a modern resurgence of Aristotle’s
equity principle, there is a strong utilitarian tradition of treating otherwise equal
generations equally. As Sidgwick (1907, p.414) put it, “the time at which a man
exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view.”
However, a serious doubt was raised by Koopmans (1960) on the sustainability
of this principle by showing that the rational, continuous, and stationary evalu-
ation of infinite allocation programs cannot but exhibit a phenomenon which he
christened impatience, viz., the preference for advancement along the time axis
of an outcome yielding higher utility vis-a`-vis another outcome yielding lower
utility.2 This intriguing thesis was elaborated further by Diamond (1965) into a
general impossibility theorem to the effect that there exists no social evaluation
ordering over the set of infinite utility streams which satisfies the Pareto prin-
ciple, the equity principle a` la Aristotle and Sidgwick in the form of anonymity,
and continuity with respect to the sup topology. His work was followed by,
among others, Banerjee and Mitra (2007b), Campbell (1985), Lauwers (1997),
Shinotsuka (1998), and Svensson (1980), who examined the sensitivity of Dia-
mond’s impossibility theorem on the choice of underlying topology. Basu and
Mitra (2003) dealt with the case where social evaluation orderings need not be
continuous, but they can be represented by numerical functions. Recent studies
by Lauwers (2007) and Zame (2007) are concerned with the conjecture due to
Fleurbaey and Michel (2003). According to Lauwers and Zame, the existence of
any (complete and transitive) social evaluation ordering that satisfies the Pareto
principle and the Aristotle-Sidgwick equity principle must necessarily be based
on the axiom of choice. Since they work with different domains of the social
evaluation orderings, their arguments are quite different, and their results are
non-comparable with each other.
Recollect that the equity principle a` la Aristotle and Sidgwick does not
embody any preference for egalitarian distribution of utilities among genera-
tions. Recently, there have been attempts to introduce egalitarian principles
that incorporate preferences for egalitarian distribution of utilities among gen-
erations. For example, Asheim and Tungodden (2004) and Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura (2007) extended Hammond’s (1976) equity axiom formulated
in the traditional framework of social choice theory to the context of ranking
infinite utility streams. Likewise, Fleurbaey and Michel (2001; 2003), Hara,
Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu (2005) and Sakai (2006) introduced two versions
of distributional egalitarianism in the spirit of Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1997),
viz., the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and the Lorenz domination principle.
1Aristotle, The Politics, edited by S. Everson, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1988, p.176.
2See, also, Banerjee and Mitra (2007a) who identified the cardinality and the topological
structure of the set of infinite utility streams at which the social evaluation ordering exhibits
impatience.
3
While the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is concerned with the comparison
between two utility streams differing from each other only in two generations,
the Lorenz domination principle is concerned with the comparison between two
utility streams differing from each other in any finitely many generations. We
show that there exists no social evaluation relation satisfying one of these egal-
itarian principles and the weakened continuity and rationality axioms even in
the absence of the Pareto principle. We also show the incompatibility of the
weakened egalitarian principles and rationality axioms in the presence of the
Pareto principle.
When the Pareto principle is assumed, the intuition of our impossibility
results can be easily developed by considering the following sequence of infinite
utility streams which converges to (0, 0, . . . , 0, . . . ) in the sup topology:
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Note that xn+1 is ranked higher than x1 for all positive integers n by our
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle together with a rationality axiom such as quasi-
transitivity or by our Lorenz domination principle (without any rationality
axiom). On the other hand, as noted earlier, xn can be arbitrarily close to
(0, 0, . . . , 0, . . . ) as n becomes large enough, giving rise to the conflict between
our egalitarian principles, the weak Pareto principle and continuity axiom.
Apart from this Introduction, the paper consists of four sections. Section 2
introduces our notation, model and continuity axioms. Section 3 introduces the
axioms of distributional egalitarianism in the spirit of the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle, on the one hand, and in the spirit of the Lorenz domination principle,
on the other hand. It is also in this section that we show the non-existence
of a social evaluation relation over infinite utility streams satisfying one of our
axioms of distributional egalitarianism and the weakened continuity and ratio-
nality axioms even in the absence of the Pareto principle. Throughout section
2 and section 3, we invoke the sup topology in defining the weakened continuity
axioms on the social evaluation relation over infinite utility streams. In section
4, we examine the extent to which our impossibility theorems are robust with
respect to the choice of alternative topologies once the Pareto principle is im-
posed on social evaluation relations. Section 5 concludes the paper with a few
final remarks on and comparison with the existing literature.
2. Notation and Model
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Let R and N+ denote the set of all real numbers, and the set of all positive
integers, respectively. Let l∞ be the set of all bounded infinite sequences of
real numbers. In what follows, the domain X ⊂ l∞ is the set of all infinite
utility streams, viz., x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . .) ∈ X denotes an infinite sequence
of utilities, where xn ∈ R denotes the utility of generation n ∈ N+. For all x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . .), y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn, . . .) ∈ X, x ≥ y means that xn ≥ yn for
all n ∈ N+; x > y means that x ≥ y and x 6= y; x À y means that xn > yn
for all n ∈ N+. Denote by l∞+ the set of all x ∈ l∞ with x ≥ 0. We assume that
X 6= ∅ and X + l∞+ ⊆ X. The sup distance being invariant under translation,
we may moreover assume that l∞+ ⊆ X. The sup distance between x and y is
defined by
ds(x,y) = sup
n
|xn − yn|, (1)
which induces the sup topology on the domain X.
Let R be a social evaluation relation on X, viz., xRy for any pair x,y ∈
X means that the infinite utility stream x is judged to be at least as good as
another infinite utility stream y. P denotes the asymmetric part of R, viz.,
for all x,y ∈ X, xPy holds if and only if xRy and not yRx. I denotes the
symmetric part of R, viz., for all x,y ∈ X, xIy holds if and only if xRy and
yRx.
R is said to be complete if and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, xRy or yRx holds.
R is said to be transitive if and only if, for all x, y, z ∈ X, xRy and yRz imply
xRz. R is said to be an ordering if and only if it satisfies completeness as well
as transitivity. Unlike most of the preceding work along the line of Koopmans
(1960) and Diamond (1965), where the social evaluation relation is assumed to
be an ordering on X, this paper invokes much weaker rationality properties of
quasi-transitivity and acyclicity in Section 3, which are defined as follows. R
is said to be quasi-transitive if and only if P is transitive. For any t ∈ N+,
a finite subset {x1,x2, . . . ,xt} of X is called a P -cycle of order t if and only
if x1Px2,x2Px3, . . . ,xtPx1 hold. R is said to be acyclic if and only if there
exists no P -cycle of any order t, where 2 < t < +∞. It is clear that transitivity
implies quasi-transitivity, which in turn implies acyclicity. In both cases, the
converse implications do not hold in general. Lastly, we say that R is negatively
transitive if, for all x,y,z ∈ X, [not xPy, and not yPz] then not xPz. It
is easy to check that negative transitivity is equivalent to transitivity in the
presence of completeness.
For any fixed x ∈ X, define the upper contour set of R at x ∈ X by
UR(x) = {y ∈ X | yRx},
the lower contour set of R at x ∈ X by
LR(x) = {y ∈ X | xRy},
the upper contour set of P at x ∈ X by
UP (x) = {y ∈ X | yPx},
and the lower contour set of P at x ∈ X by
LP (x) = {y ∈ X | xPy}.
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Concerning the continuity requirement on R, we will consider the following
upper semi-continuity and lower semi-continuity axioms, each of which is weaker
than Diamond’s full continuity axiom.
R-Upper Semi-Continuity with Respect to the Sup Topology (RUSCs)
For all x ∈ X, UR(x) is closed with respect to the sup topology on X.
R-Lower Semi-Continuity with Respect to the Sup Topology (RLSCs)
For all x ∈ X, LR(x) is closed with respect to the sup topology on X.
P-Upper Semi-Continuity with Respect to the Sup Topology (PUSCs)
For all x ∈ X, LP (x) is open with respect to the sup topology on X.
P-Lower Semi-Continuity with Respect to the Sup Topology (PLSCs)
For all x ∈ X, UP (x) is open with respect to the sup topology on X.
If R is complete, then UR(x) = X \ LP (x) and LR(x) = X \ UP (x). Thus,
in this case, RUSCs is equivalent to PUSCs, and RLSCs is equivalent to
PLSCs.
3. Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle, Lorenz Domination
Principle, and Related Axioms of Distributional Egali-
tarianism
In contrast with the equity principle a` la Sidgwick and Diamond in the
form of anonymity, we consider two axioms which embody alternative forms of
preference for egalitarian distribution of utilities among generations.
Our first axiom has been introduced in the literature by, for example, Bossert,
Sprumont and Suzumura (2007), and Sakai (2006), which reads as follows:
Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle (PDT)
For any x, y ∈ X, and any pair of positive integers i, j ∈ N+, if there exists
an ² > 0 such that
yi = xi + ² ≤ xj − ² = yj, xk = yk for all k ∈ N+\{i, j} (2)
holds, then yPx must also hold.
We also introduce an alternative formulation of egalitarian preferences on
the set of infinite utility streams in terms of the concept of Lorenz domination.
For each x ∈ X and each n ∈ N+, let 1xn be defined by 1xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
For any n ∈ N+, let us say that 1xn Lorenz dominates 1yn if and only if (i)∑n
t=1 xt =
∑n
t=1 yt and (ii) if ϕ and ψ are permutations on {1, . . . , n} such that
xϕ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ xϕ(n) and yψ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ yψ(n), then
∑m
t=1 xϕ(t) ≥
∑m
t=1 yψ(t) for
every m = 1, . . . , n, with a strict inequality holding for some m.
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Lorenz Domination Principle (LD)
For any x,y ∈ X, if there exists n∗ ∈ N+ such that (a) 1xn∗ Lorenz domi-
nates 1yn∗ , and (b) xn = yn for all n ∈ N+ such that n > n∗, then xPy must
hold.
Observe that LD implies PDT. With PDT and LD close at hand, we are
ready to present the following impossibility results.3
Theorem 1
There exists no acyclic social evaluation relation R satisfying PDT and
PUSCs.
Theorem 2
There exists no social evaluation relation R satisfying LD and PUSCs.
To prove Theorem 1, we first introduce a symbol. For every x,y ∈ X,
yRPDx if and only if there exists a finite sequence
(
z0,z1, . . . , zh
)
in X such
that z0 = x, zh = y, and for every k = 1, . . . , h, there exist a pair of positive
integers i and j and an ² > 0 such that
zki = z
k−1
i + ² ≤ zk−1j − ² = zkj and zk−1t = zkt for every t ∈ N+ \ {i, j}. (3)
It should be noted that RPD is transitive. Note also that if a social evaluation
relation R satisfies PDT and yRPDx, then there is a finite sequence in X
starting from x and arriving at y that is increasingly desirable with respect to
P .
The following lemma due to Sakai (2006) proves useful in establishing The-
orems 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 [Sakai (2006, Lemma 6)] There exist an x ∈ X and a sequence
(xn)n∈N+ in X such that x
1RPDx, x
n+1RPDx
n for every n ∈ N+, and xn → x
as n→∞ in the sup topology.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove that if a social evaluation relation satisfies
PDT and PUSCs, then it is not acyclic. Let R be a social evaluation relation
satisfying PDT and PUSCs. Let x and (xn)n∈N+ be as in Lemma 1. Since
xn+1RPDx
n for every n, PDT implies that for every n ≥ 2, there exists a finite
sequence starting from x1 and arriving at xn that is increasingly desirable with
respect to P . Since x1RPDx and x
n → x, PUSCs implies that x1Pxn for
every sufficiently large n. Hence, for every sufficiently large n, there exists a
P -cycle involving x1, . . . ,xn. Thus R is not acyclic.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that R is a
social evaluation relation satisfying LD and PUSCs. Let x and (xn)n∈N+ be
as in Lemma 1. Since x1RPDx, LD implies that x
1Px. From xn → x as
3Observe that the assumptions of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are expressed in terms of P ,
not R itself, so that the indifference relation I has nothing to do with the validity of these
propositions.
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n → ∞, PUSCs implies that x1Pxn holds for every sufficiently large n. On
the other hand, since xn+1RPDx
n for every n, xn Lorenz dominates x1 for every
n ≥ 2. Thus, LD implies that x1Pxn must not hold for any n ≥ 2. This is a
contradiction.
Two remarks concerning Theorems 1 and 2, in conjunction with the results
of Sakai (2006), are in order. First, by making use of Lemma 4 in Sakai (2006)
and by following the similar proof methods for Theorems 1 and 2, we can show
that (i) there exists no acyclic social evaluation relation R satisfying PDT and
PLSCs; and (ii) there exists no social evaluation relation R satisfying LD and
PLSCs. Second, Sakai (2006) shows that there is no quasi-transitive social
evaluation relation R satisfying PDT and either RUSCs or RLSCs. It would
therefore be fair to say that the impossibility theorems are robust with respect
to the choice of continuity axioms introduced in the last section.
To identify the scope of our impossibility theorems, especially when the
Pareto principle is additionally imposed, let us now consider weaker variants of
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and the Lorenz domination principle:4
Weak Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle (WPDT)
For any x, y ∈ X, and any pair of positive integers i, j ∈ N+, if there exists
an ² > 0 such that (2) holds, then not xPy.
Weak Lorenz Domination Principle (WLD)
For any x,y ∈ X, if there exists n∗ ∈ N+ such that (a) 1xn∗ Lorenz dom-
inates 1yn∗ , and (b) xn = yn for all n ∈ N+ such that n > n∗, then not yPx.
Since P is an asymmetric relation, these variants are indeed weaker than their
original forms.
The first thing we should note on these variants is that they are so weak that
there exist social evaluation relations satisfying both of them. As an example,
take the social evaluation ordering R that exhibits total indifference, that is,
xRy for all x,y ∈ X. Then, for any x,y ∈ X, xPy must not hold. Hence both
WPDT and WLD are vacuously satisfied. All of the continuity assumptions
introduced in the last section are also satisfied.
We are therefore led to consider whether these weaker variants are compat-
ible with the Pareto principle. Here the issue of the possibility-impossibility
divide becomes quite subtle, and we show that one version of the Pareto prin-
ciple is compatible with bothWPDT andWLD, but another is not, although
the two versions would be equivalent were there to be only finitely many gen-
erations.
Specifically, we take up the following weak versions of the Pareto principle.
Here and hereafter, 1 is the infinite stream that repeats 1 indefinitely.
Weak Pareto Principle (WP)
For all x,y ∈ X, if xÀ y, then xPy.
Very Weak Pareto Principle (VWP)
4We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of investigation.
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For all x,y ∈ X, if there exists an ² > 0 such that xÀ y+ ²1, then xPy.
VWP is weaker thanWP. YetVWP implies local non-satiation, viz., for every
y ∈ X and every ² > 0, there exists an x ∈ X such that ds(x,y) < ² and xPy.
The following proposition shows that WPDT and WLD are compatible with
VWP, all of the continuity assumptions, and some vestiges of the properties
of an ordering.
Proposition 1
Define a social evaluation relation R∗ by
xR∗y if and only if inf
n
(yn − xn) ≤ 0
for all x,y ∈ X. Then R∗ is complete, quasi-transitive (but not transitive), and
satisfies WPDT, WLD, VWP, PUSCs, PLSCs, RUSCs, and RLSCs.5, 6
Proof of Proposition 1 Let P ∗ be the asymmetric part of R∗. We shall first
prove that, for all x,y ∈ X, xP ∗y if and only if there exists an ² > 0 such
that x À y + ²1. In fact, xP ∗y if and only if xR∗y and not yR∗x, which is
equivalent to saying that infn (yn − xn) ≤ 0 and infn (xn − yn) > 0. But the
second inequality is equivalent to saying that xÀ y+ ²1 for some ² > 0, which
then implies that the first inequality must then be satisfied. Thus, xP ∗y if and
only if x À y + ²1 for some ² > 0. Hence R∗ satisfies VWP. It also follows
from this fact that R∗ satisfies quasi-transitivity, PUSCs, and PLSCs. In the
above argument, we saw that if infn (xn − yn) > 0, then infn (yn − xn) ≤ 0. This
shows that R∗ is complete. Hence R∗ also satisfies RUSCs and RLSCs. For
all x,y ∈ X, if there exists an n∗ ∈ N+ such that xn = yn for every n > n∗, then
we must not have xP ∗y. Thus R∗ satisfies WLD, and hence WPDT. Finally,
to show that R∗ is not transitive, let x = 1, y = 1 + (0, 1, 0, . . .) and z = 21.
Then, xR∗y and yR∗z, as infn(yn − xn) = 0 and infn(zn − yn) = 0. But not
xR∗z, as infn(zn − xn) = 1.
The next proposition shows thatWPDT andWLD are incompatible with
WP and PUSCs.
Proposition 2
(1) There exists no negatively transitive social evaluation relation satisfying
WPDT, PUSCs and WP.
(2) There exists no social evaluation relation satisfyingWLD, PUSCs and
WP.
Proof of Proposition 2 (1) Suppose there were such a relation R. Let x =
(1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, · · · , 1/2n−1, · · · ), and xn = (sn/n, sn/n, · · · , sn/n, 1/2n, · · · ),
where sn = 2(1 − 1/2n) and there are n terms of sn/n in xn. Note that
5As for the continuity properties, more can be said: R∗ is a closed subset of X ×X and
P ∗ is an open subset of X ×X with respect to the product topology induced from the sup
topology on X, where P ∗ is the asymmetric part of R∗.
6The social evaluation relation R∗ satisfies the equity principle a` la Sidgwick in the form
of anonymity as well.
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xn+1RPDx
n for every n, because RPD is transitive and x
n+1 can be obtained
from xn by transferring sn/n− sn+1/(n+1) from each of the first n generations
to the (n+1)-th generation. Then, since RPD is transitive and x
1 = x, xnRPDx
for every n. By WPDT and the negative transitivity of R, we must have not
xPxn for each n. On the other hand, by WP, xP0 implies that xPxn for
every large enough n since xn → 0 as n→∞, which is a contradiction.
(2) Suppose there were such a relation R. Consider x and xn defined above.
WP implies that xP0. By PUSCs and noting that xn → 0 as n → ∞, we
must have xPxn for sufficiently large n. On the other hand, by WLD, not
xPxn for every n. This is a contradiction.
We may note in the proofs that, for our main impossibility results, a crucial
step in the proofs is to establish the existence of x,y ∈ X and a sequence
(xn)n∈N+ such that x
n → x, xnRPDy, and yPx. This may be established
either by PDT and Lemma 1, or by LD and Lemma 1, or by WPDT and
WP, or by WLD and WP.
4. Robustness
The impossibility theorems obtained so far commonly invoked the upper
or lower semi-continuity of a social evaluation relation with respect to the sup
topology. Yet, the foregoing studies on the evaluation of infinite utility streams,
e.g. Campbell (1985), Lauwers (1997), Shinotsuka (1998) and Svensson (1980),
showed that some impossibility results hinge squarely on the choice of a topol-
ogy. The choice of a topology, with respect to which the semi-continuity re-
quirement is given, matters to the validity of these impossibility theorems.
In this section, we show that our impossibility theorems are valid for a wide
class of topologies. This result can be interpreted as justifying the extensive
use of the sup topology in the literature. Our approach, however, can be dis-
tinguished from most of the foregoing studies in that we do not specify any
particular topology other than the canonical sup topology to establish impos-
sibility theorems. Rather, we consider classes of topologies satisfying certain
conditions, such as linearity and local solidness, and clarify the relationship be-
tween the semi-continuity requirement with respect to these topologies, on the
one hand, and the semi-continuity requirement with respect to the sup topol-
ogy, on the other hand, to extend the impossibility theorems in the previous
section.
Let us start with locally solid linear topologies. For each x ∈ X, let |x| be
the infinite sequence of non-negative real numbers obtained from x by replacing
each term xn with the absolute value thereof. A subset A of X is said to be solid
if, for every x,y ∈ l∞, |x| < |y| and y ∈ A imply x ∈ A. A linear topology on
l∞ is said to be locally solid if it has a basis for 0 consisting of solid sets. The
sup topology is locally solid, because the sets of the form {x ∈ l∞|ds(x,y) ≤ δ}
with δ > 0 define a fundamental system of neighborhoods of y. In fact, it
is easy to show that any other locally solid linear topology on l∞ is coarser
than the sup topology. Since the semi-continuity requirement with respect to
a coarser topology is a stronger restriction on social evaluation relations, all
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the impossibility theorems in Section 3 still hold when the semi-continuity with
respect to the sup topology is replaced by the semi-continuity with respect to
any other locally solid linear topology.
Next, we turn to a continuity requirement involving scalar multiplications.
Linear Upper Semi-Continuity (LUSC)
For all x,y ∈ X, {α ∈ R | y + α1 ∈ LP (x)} is an open subset of {α ∈ R |
y + α1 ∈ X} (with respect to the Euclidean topology).
LUSC is nothing but the P-upper semi-continuity when the comparison to
a utility stream x is restricted to the line in the direction of 1 going through
another utility stream y. Similar conditions appeared in Herstein and Milnor
(1953) in the context of expected utilities, and in Inoue (2006) in the context
of equilibrium analysis.
Lemma 2
Every quasi-transitive social evaluation relation satisfyingVWP and LUSC
also satisfies PUSCs.
Proof of Lemma 27
Let R be a quasi-transitive social evaluation relation satisfying VWP and
LUSC. Let xPy. It suffices to show that there exists a neighborhood Y of y
in X with respect to the sup topology such that xPz for every z ∈ Y .
Define A = {α ∈ R | y + α1 ∈ X} and B = {α ∈ R | y + α1 ∈ LP (x)},
then A ⊇ R+, B 3 0, and, by LUSC, B is an open subset of A. Hence there
exists a δ > 0 such that δ ∈ B, that is,
xP (y + δ1). (4)
Define Y = {z ∈ X | there exists an α < δ such that y + α1 À z}. Then
y ∈ Y . We now prove that Y is an open subset of X. Let z ∈ Y . Then
there exists an α < δ such that y + α1 À z. Then, for every w ∈ X, if
ds(w, z) < δ − α, then
w ¿ z + ds(w,z)1¿ (y + α1) + ds(w,z)1 = y + (α + ds(w,z))1.
Since α + ds(w,z) < δ, this show that w ∈ Y . Hence Y is an open subset of
X.
For every z ∈ Y , there exists an ² > 0 such that y + δ1 À z + ²1. Hence,
by VWP,
(y + δ1)P z. (5)
By (4), (5), and quasi-transitivity, xP z.
In place of LUSC, we could use an alternative version of linear upper semi-
continuity, which requires {α ∈ R | y + α1 ∈ UR(x)} to be a closed subset of
{α ∈ R | y + α1 ∈ X} for all x,y ∈ X. We could then show that every transi-
tive social evaluation relation satisfying VWP and this version of linear upper
7A similar proof appeared in Inoue (2006).
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semi-continuity also satisfies RUSCs. If R is complete, then the two versions
of linear upper semi-continuity are equivalent. Thus, every social evaluation
ordering satisfying VWP and either of the two upper semi-continuity axioms
also satisfies PUSCs and RUSCs.
It immediately follows from the impossibility theorems in Section 3 and
Lemma 2 that there is no quasi-transitive social evaluation relation which
satisfies VWP, LUSC, either PDT or LD.
We now explore two further implications of LUSC. Note first that since
the scalar multiplication α 7→ y+α1 is continuous with respect to every linear
topology on l∞, if the upper semi-continuity is satisfied for some linear topol-
ogy, then LUSC is satisfied as well. Thus, for quasi-transitive social evaluation
relations satisfying VWP, the impossibility theorems in Section 3 can be gen-
eralized to the case in which LP (x) is open with respect to an arbitrary linear
topology. This generalization is not vacuous. Indeed, Kolmogorov and Fomin
(1971, Problem 10 of Section 17, Chapter 4) describe how to construct a linear
topology stronger than the sup topology.
The second implication of LUSC is concerned with social evaluation order-
ings that can be represented by concave utility functions. We define X∗ as the
set of all x ∈ X for which there exists a δ > 0 such that x − δ1 ∈ X. We
then claim that there exists no social evaluation ordering R on the domain X
which is represented by a concave function f : X → R, and the restriction of
which onto X∗ satisfies VWP and either PDT or LD. This claim can easily
be proved based on the fact that every concave function defined on an interval
of the real line is continuous on the interior of the interval.
To appreciate the significance of this extension, recall that a Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function is a function that maps each possible profile of utility
levels for finitely many individuals to a single social utility level. In the welfare
analysis, it is common to assume that a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare func-
tion satisfies the Pareto Principle to embody the idea of respecting efficiency,
as well as concavity to embody the idea of respecting egalitarianism. The func-
tion f : X → R can be considered as an extension of a Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function to the case of infinitely many individuals. Our result
then shows that once the Pareto principle and concavity are accepted for an
infinite-dimensional Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, the upper semi-
continuity with respect to the sup topology is no additional restriction on social
welfare functions as long as the comparison is restricted onto the utility streams
that are uniformly bounded away from the minimum levels in X.
5. Concluding Remarks
In view of the recent plethora of possibility/impossibility theorems on the
evaluation of infinite utility streams, it is of necessity that we have a scheme
of logical classifications of relevant results. There are three criteria that play
crucial role in what follows.
The first criterion is about the rationality condition that is required of the
social evaluation relation, viz., completeness, transitivity, negative transitivity,
acyclicity, and the like. The second criterion is the robustness of the evaluation
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ranking to a small perturbation of infinite utility streams, viz., whether or
not the social evaluation relation satisfies continuity, upper semi-continuity,
and lower semi-continuity with respect to some appropriate topology on the
domain. The third criterion is about the sensitivity conditions imposed on the
social evaluation relation, and we make use of the two types of conditions in
our scheme. The first type is the sensitivity to efficiency, viz., whether or not it
satisfies the Pareto principle, the weak Pareto principle, and the strong Pareto
principle. The second type is the sensitivity to equity, viz., whether or not it
satisfies the procedural fairness in the sense of the Aristotle-Sidgwick anonymity,
the distributional egalitarianism such as the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle or
the Lorenz domination principle, and the like.
Invoking this classificatory scheme, the classical Diamond impossibility the-
orem can be characterized by the combination of
D(1) completeness and transitivity,
D(2) continuity with respect to the sup topology, and
D(3) (i) strong Pareto and (ii) anonymity.
Theorems 1 and 2 of Sakai (2006) can be characterized by the combinations of
S(1) quasi-transitivity,
S(2) upper or lower semi-continuity with respect to the sup topology, and
S(3) (i) none and (ii) Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
Likewise, our Theorem 1 can be characterized by the combination of
HSSX1(1) acyclicity,
HSSX1(2) upper or lower semi-continuity with respect to the sup topology,
HSSX1(3) (i) none and (ii) Pigou-Dalton transfer principle,
whereas our Theorem 2 can be characterized by the combination of
HSSX2(1) none,
HSSX2(2) upper or lower semi-continuity with respect to the sup topology
HSSX2(3) (i) none and (ii) Lorenz domination principle.
Needless to say, most if not all impossibility theorems in this arena can be
similarly characterized. It is our hope that the classification of the impossi-
bility theorems along this line will be found useful in bringing the nature and
significance of our results to the fore.
In concluding this paper, a final remark may be in order. Although our
analysis relied heavily on the semi-continuity requirement on social evaluation
relation, Basu and Mitra (2003) did not impose any such requirement. Instead,
they assumed that social evaluation relations must be representable by numer-
ical functions. Representability implies completeness and transitivity. Hence
13
any impossibility theorem that does not impose completeness or transitivity is
outside the scope of their impossibility theorems. This highlights the difference
between their and our approaches, as our impossibility theorems use acyclicity,
or even less, in place of completeness and transitivity. The same can be said of
the approach by Zame (2007). As he himself exemplified, one of his theorems,
which asserts that the existence of a (complete and transitive) social evalua-
tion ordering satisfying the Pareto principle and the Aristotle-Sidgwick equity
principle hinges crucially on the axiom of choice, would not survive once the
completeness were dispensed with.
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